The 2017 hurricane season devastated the U.S. gulf coast with two of the worst hurricanes in history: Harvey (107 deaths, $125B in damages) and Irma (134 deaths, $50B in damages). Despite extensive warnings, most affected residents did not evacuate their homes before the storms hit, complicating rescue and recovery efforts. Combining a large GPS dataset for 2.7 million smartphone users in Florida and Texas with U.S. Census demographic data and 2016 U.S. Presidential election precinct-level results, we empirically examine hurricane evacuation behavior. A difference-in-differences analysis demonstrates that Trump/Clinton vote share strongly predicts evacuation rates, but only after the emergence of conservative-media dismissals of hurricane warnings in September 2017, just before Irma made landfall in Florida. Following this viral "hurricane trutherism", we estimate that Trump-voting Florida residents were 10-11% less likely to evacuate Irma than Clinton-voters (34% vs. 45%) after controlling for key demographic and geographic covariates, highlighting one consequence of political polarization. This effect size is similar in magnitude to that of an official hurricane watch. We confirm the causal impact of hurricane advisories using a spatial regression-discontinuity design that compares evacuation rates for residents living just on opposite sides of county boundaries who received differential alerts. A hurricane watch causally increases rapid evacuations (within 24 hours) by 6 percentage-points compared to no watch, and by 4 percentage-points compared to a tropical storm watch.
Introduction
The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was the costliest on record, with damages exceeding $125 billion following Harvey, $50 billion following Irma, and $90 billion following Maria [1] . These storms directly caused hundreds of deaths and, indirectly, thousands more due to slow recovery efforts, lack of sanitation, and reduced access to medical services. Increasingly destructive storms his show aired, conservative commentator Ann Coulter also questioned the reported severity of Hurricane Irma, sparking thousands of both supportive and outraged comments on Twitter [8] .
Reporting on both Limbaugh and Coulter reached several "mainstream" news outlets, extending awareness of the controversy beyond Limbaugh's regular listeners [9, 10, 11] . Before this, only occasional instances of "hurricane trutherism" occurred on right-wing blogs, making comparisons before and after Limbaugh's statements a useful difference-in-differences measure of partisan evacuation behavior. Google Trends over a five-year period confirms both the novelty and virality of this hurricane skepticism, peaking just before Irma made Florida landfall (Appendix Figure S1 ). We compute differences in evacuation rates between Trump and Clinton voters-both before and after the politicization of hurricane risk assessment-to measure a potentially life-threatening consequence of partisan distrust in news. We use a similar approach as [12] , who estimate the cost of political polarization through abbreviated Thanksgiving dinners among cross-party families following the divisive 2016 election.
Our study adds to the growing literature on the role partisanship plays in news receptivity and biased belief formation. Allcott and Gentzkow find that both Democrats and Republicans were more likely to believe "fake news" stories about the 2016 election if the stories matched their own political views [13] . Kahan et al. find that the divide widens among those measuring high in science literary and numerical ability, suggesting that partisan disagreements might persist even as scientific evidence accumulates [14] . Whether this stems from motivated reasoning or a lack of critical thinking is under debate [15] . Other research suggests that reducing susceptibility to polarizing misinformation may be possible with low-cost, crowd-sourced flagging of low-quality news sources [16] .
Surveys show that beliefs about climate change-and its effect on strengthening hurricane intensity-display a political ideological divide: 60% of liberal Democrats but only 19% of conservative Republicans believe that climate change will produce more severe storms [17] . Even among those with more science education [18] or meteorological experts [19] , views on the existence and causes of climate change differ along political lines. Parallel divides appear in hypothetical responses to a warning of an impending hurricane [20] , or a government evacuation order [21] . Official warnings have been shown to consistently correlate with stated evacuation intentions [3] . These studies, however, rely either on questions about a hypothetical hurricane, or on post-landfall surveys months or years after the storm, and thus potentially suffer from survivorship bias, imperfect recall of evacuation timing, or ex-post rationalization of critical decisions [22] .
In this paper, we study evacuation patterns for Hurricanes Matthew, Harvey, and Irma using GPS location data for more than 30 million U.S. smartphone users. Our study is the first to observe actual evacuation behavior for millions of residents hit by at least one major hurricane. Beyond simply altering stated beliefs about climate change, partisan skepticism shifts people's choice to evacuate an oncoming storm, a personally consequential decision. To our knowledge, no prior study has empirically estimated the causal effect of advance hurricane warnings on evacuations, despite the central role such advisories play in mitigating loss of life. We do so here by exploiting spatial boundaries in the roll out of hurricane watches and warnings, using a regression-discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the direct causal effect of a hurricane alert on evacuation behavior [23] .
Methods

Data Summary
Our primary dataset consists of anonymized smartphone location data for more than 30 million U.S. residents, from the data firm SafeGraph. Each observation ("ping") includes an anonymous phone ID, date, time, latitude and longitude coordinates, and location accuracy. Smartphone typically ping every ten minutes, with more frequent pings (approximately every 5 seconds) when driving.
Dates and times of hurricane alerts come from the National Hurricane Center (Appendix Tables   S3-S5 ) [24] . Demographic data at the census tract and block group level is from the 2012-16
American Community Survey while block data is from the 2010 U.S. Census. Variables include residential density, median age, median household income, fraction with a college degree or higher, employment rate, and race/ethnicity. Geographic variables include distance to the coast [25] and elevation above sea-level [26] . Voting data comes from the 2016 U.S. Presidential election precinctlevel results (the finest granularity legally permitted), specified as the two-party vote share won by Donald Trump [27] . All variables are summarized in Table 1 .
Definitions
We examine smartphone data over a three-week period for each hurricane. To estimate a user's home location, we examine pings over one week, beginning 10 days before their state's first hurricane alert (September 7, 2017 for Irma). We define a user's "home area" as their modal location between 10:00 pm and 6:00 am over this period, aggregated to the geohash-7 to preserve anonymity. For Hurricanes Irma and Matthew, we include all smartphone users in Florida; for Hurricane Harvey, we exclude users in Texas who live more than 300 km from the coast, as they did not receive any hurricane alerts and were not in the path of the storm.
A hurricane "evacuation" is defined as a smartphone user spending >24 continuous hours at least 100 meters away from their home area, over a period beginning four days before the first alert until four days after all alerts were discontinued (September 3-15, 2017 for Irma). This definition captures both early evacuees and evacuations to nearby shelters, and uses a consistent window across the state of Florida. As a robustness exercise we consider a >48-hour definition, summarized in Appendix Table S2 . The smartphone data is similarly processed for Hurricane Matthew in Florida 
Difference-in-Differences Specification
We examine whether evacuation behavior differs by likely political affiliation post-Limbaugh (our diff-in-diff analysis) using the following linear probability model:
where Evac24h i refers to a >24-hour evacuation during the hurricane. T rumpShare i is the 2016 Presidential election precinct-level two-party vote share won by Donald Trump, and T rumpShare i × Af terLimbaugh i is our main diff-in-diff variable (T rumpShare i times an indicator variable for post-Limbaugh's statements). HurricaneAlert i indicates whether individual i resides in a county that received a hurricane watch and/or warning. The vector F i is a set of fixed effects for hurricanes and sub-state geographical units such as counties. The vector X i includes demographic, geographic, and census controls for individual i ( Table 1 ).
Robustness Tests
Our diff-in-diff coefficient β 2 estimates the partisan effect of Limbaugh's statements on evacuation behavior. As tests of this coefficient's estimating assumptions, we perform three robustness exercises. First, we vary the geographical level of both the fixed effects and corresponding clustering of standard errors (Table 2 ). This examines whether the evacuation wedge between likely Trump and Clinton voters during Hurricane Irma can be explained by spatial autocorrelation in hurricane intensity.
Second, we replicate our main diff-in-diff regressions using a stricter, >48-hour definition of evacuation (Appendix Table S2 ). This tests whether our results are sensitive to the cut-off used to define a hurricane evacuation.
Finally, we test our main coefficient's stability to unobservable selection as developed in [28] and recently updated in [29] . This procedure adjusts the main coefficient on T rumpShare × Af terLimbaugh to remove the effect of selection on unobservables, and further calculates how strong the selection on unobservables would need to be for the causal effect to be zero.
Regression Discontinuity Specification
Estimating the effect of a hurricane watch on evacuation behavior poses challenges due to endogeneity (e.g., strong winds or precipitation are correlated with the NHC's timing and targeting of alerts and may themselves trigger an evacuation) and omitted variable bias (e.g., news coverage, social media, and peer-to-peer communication may spike concurrently with NHC alerts, and may also directly affect evacuations). To address these issues, we propose a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design, exploiting the fact that NHC alerts are typically issued at the county-level.
Conceptually, suppose two individuals reside within a few blocks of one another-but in different counties-such that one receives a hurricane watch in advance of the other. We examine the extent to which the earlier alert triggers rapid evacuation (i.e., within 24 hours) in the focal county.
We focus on rapid evacuation because the NHC typically upgrades hurricane watches to hurricane warnings within 12 to 24 hours, and we aim to estimate the causal effect of the initial watch.
We estimate the following local-linear RD model:
where Rapid i corresponds to individual i evacuating within 24 hours of the hurricane watch, X c refers to the cut-off (i.e., the county border), X i is the running variable (i.e., individual i's home area), so X i − X c represents the distance between individual i's home and the county border, and T rumpShare i is as specified previously. HurricaneW atch i is a binary variable indicating whether individual i resides in a county that received a hurricane watch:
The coefficient τ represents the local average treatment effect (of a hurricane watch versus no watch) at the cut-off. The coefficients, β 0 , β 1 , and β 2 represent the intercept, slope before the cut-off, and slope after the cut-off, respectively. We follow the approach in [30] to estimate a covariate-adjusted local-linear RD design, in which T rumpShare i is controlled for but β 3 is not directly estimated. While controlling for covariates is not strictly necessary, it is prudent to control for vote share because our spatial discontinuities occur at political boundaries; our results do not substantively change if this covariate is removed. Our RD estimator includes individuals living within a "bandwidth" of the border, where bandwidth selection is based on MSE-optimal point estimation, and linearly weights observations using a triangular kernel.
We employ this RD specification for Hurricane Irma, using the border between Martin (n = 11, 208) and Palm Beach (n = 83, 707) counties in Florida (Appendix Figure S5 ). We consider other potential RD sites, but these are either too sparsely populated (e.g., Dixie and Levy counties) or have large geographic or demographic jumps at the border (e.g., Pinellas and Manatee counties are separated by Tampa Bay and the 7 km long Sunshine Skyway Bridge, and display different demographics on either side of the bridge).
We use a similar specification for Hurricane Harvey in Texas (Appendix Figure S6 ). On August 23, 2017 at 10:00 am, Brazoria County (n = 26, 510) received a hurricane watch and neighboring Galveston County (n = 28, 437) received a tropical storm watch. Here, the local average treatment effect is the difference in rapid evacuations following a hurricane watch versus tropical storm watch.
Robustness Tests
We run placebo RD regressions for both RD analyses, replacing Rapid i with Evac24h i , which includes any 24-hour evacuation over the hurricane's duration, not just evacuations immediately following an official alert. In both placebo regressions, the MSE-optimal bandwidth is re-estimated using the same procedure as our main RD specifications. Substantial variation exists in evacuation rates across all three hurricanes, even among geographically proximate regions (Figure 1 ). During Irma, for example, evacuation rates in Broward
County averaged 40% among the 141,092 individuals in our sample, yet ranged from 20% to 78% among precincts within 5 km of the coast, an area at high-risk of storm surge and flooding (Appendix Figure S2 ).
Difference-in-Differences of Partisan Evacuation Behavior
Using precinct-level vote share as a proxy for likely political affiliation, Figure 2 illustrates the raw differences in evacuation behavior between residents of Trump-and Clinton-majority precincts across these three hurricanes. Trump voters evacuated at substantially lower rates during Irmaconsistent with Republican-leaning skepticism of hurricane risks-but at similar rates during both Harvey and Matthew.
Our main diff-in-diff analysis ( given the fixed effects, and find our results are robust to spatial autocorrelation. We also consider a narrower definition of "evacuation" as leaving home for ¿48 hours during a hurricane. Although 3-7% fewer people evacuate under this definition, our general findings are unchanged with Trump voters 11-12 percentage-points (p < 0.0001) less likely to evacuate (Appendix Table S2 ).
As a final robustness test, we adjust for unobservable variable selection based on the approach outlined in [29] , which generates a significantly stronger estimate than our original regression (δ = −0.003, z = −28.19, p < 0.0001). This indicates that residents of more Trump-voting precincts in Florida have, on average, observable demographics associated with higher predicted evacuation
rates, yet their actual evacuation rates during Irma are lower than their Clinton-voting counterparts.
In other words, partisan evacuation differences post-Limbaugh are unlikely to be explained by omitted variable bias and, if anything, underestimate the true causal effect size.
Causal Effect of Hurricane Alerts
To interpret the size of our measured partisan effect, note that in Table 2 , the coefficient on T rumpShare × Af terLimbaugh is generally larger than the effect of receiving a government hurricane alert. The presence of spatial fixed-effects in columns 3-4 complicates this comparison, as the coefficient on HurricaneAlert mixes both the direct effect of receiving an alert and the greater evacuation rate during Irma from areas of Florida that did not receive an alert during lesswidespread Matthew. In our next analysis, we isolate the causal effect of NHC hurricane alerts, as a basis of comparison to our main partisan effect. Moreover, this quantity may be of interest to the government agencies that set and implement such alerts.
We employ an RD analysis of hurricane alerts by examining neighboring counties that share a densely populated boundary but received different alerts, a situation that occurred once during Irma. On September 7, 2017 at 11:00 am, residents of coastal Palm Beach County, Florida received the first hurricane watch for Irma, while neighboring coastal Martin County had not yet received any alerts (Appendix Figure S5 ). Following [30] , we estimate the optimal RD bandwidth to include 0.031 0.035 0.043 0.044 * * * p < 0.0001, * * p < 0.001, * p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include polynomials for distance to coast and elevation. Demographic controls include residential density, median age, median household income, college graduation rate, employment, and race/ethnicity. Full results in Appendix Table S1 . residents living within 7.8 km of the county border. Within this sample, a hurricane watch causally increases the probability of evacuating by nearly 6 percentage-points (p = 0.000064) ( Table 3) . That is, Palm Beach residents were discontinuously more likely to evacuate in the 24 hours following their county's hurricane watch, compared to their geographically proximate Martin County neighbors.
A similar discontinuity occurred before Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas. On August 23, 2017 at 10:00 am, residents of coastal Brazoria County received a hurricane watch, while neighboring Galveston County received a lower-grade tropical storm watch at the exact same time (Appendix Figure S6 ). Using a similar RD approach, we estimate that a hurricane watch increases the probability of rapid evacuation by nearly 4 percentage-points, vis-à-vis a tropical storm watch (p = 0.013).
The key identifying assumption of these analyses is that besides differential hurricane alerts, no other significant drivers of evacuation behavior vary discontinuously at the county boundary.
Although evacuations are measured at the individual level in our data, demographics and vote-share vary at the census tract and precinct levels, respectively, precluding us from directly testing for demographic discontinuities. However, we run placebo RD analyses using any evacuation during the hurricane (Table 3 ). During Irma, Martin County eventually received a hurricane watch and subsequent warning 12-18 hours after the same alerts were issued in Palm Beach County (Appendix Figure S7 ). Thus, we do not expect an overall evacuation discontinuity at the Palm Beach-Martin boundary, unless driven by discontinuous demographic differences. Neither placebo regression finds evidence of jumps in overall evacuation rates, suggesting that our RD approach is sound. Finally, while Hurricane alert status changes discontinuously at county boundaries, news reporting and social spillovers from evacuating neighbors likely make our estimates lower bounds of the true causal effect of alerts.
Discussion
Rising ocean temperatures are expected to increase the frequency and intensity of hurricanesa longstanding scientific consensus [31, 32] -and record rainfall, flooding, and wind speeds have characterized recent storm seasons [33] . Partisan skepticism of climate science, hurricane risks, and official alerts drove an evacuation wedge between Trump and Clinton voters during Hurricane Irma, larger than most demographic predictors, and similar in magnitude to the direct effect of receiving a hurricane watch.
The vast majority of residents in our sample stay home during a hurricane. Among those who do evacuate, however, one-third depart before an NHC watch is issued, two-thirds evacuate within 24 hours, and nearly 90% leave within 48 hours of the issued watch (Appendix Figure S8) , with the observed partisan evacuation wedge arising even before the earliest official alerts ( Figure   2 ). By casting doubt on the severity of Hurricane Irma, government advisories and concomitant news reporting, partisan media outlets negated a large share of precautionary evacuations. Immediately following Limbaugh's and Coulter's original statements, reporting by traditional news outlets greatly expanded awareness of these partisan claims (Appendix Figure S1 ). Altogether, this news coverage appears to have led to an immediate and high-stake schism in evacuation behavior, complicating the ability of scientific and government agencies to mitigate storm risks.
Post-Irma, the political polarization of hurricanes has persisted, as illustrated by Limbaugh's recent assertions:
[M]any people in government or government-related jobs are totally now invested in this whole idea that human beings in the United States are causing climate change and causing these hurricanes. . . But for people that don't have any history knowledge or perspective, theyre gonna fall into the trap of thinking that these things are bigger and worse than they've ever been so it must be climate change, and nothing could be further from the truth.
-Rush Limbaugh, September 3, 2019 [34] Federal agencies, including NOAA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are increasingly investing in efforts to counter hurricane rumors and fake news, diverting limited resources and personnel from more critical tasks and reporting [35, 36] . Although the politicization of hurricane warnings shows no signs of abating [37] , a remaining question is whether its impact on actual evacuation behavior is durable.
Our study has several limitations. Although our dataset includes movement patterns for millions of residents in Florida and Texas, we only observe smartphone users, likely under-weighting some populations (e.g., older residents). We define an "evacuation" as departing one's home for >24 hours during the storm, but it is possible that someone left their home yet remained in a high-risk area. Repeating our analysis with a >48-hour definition does not meaningfully change any results.
While it is beyond the scope of our analysis to determine optimal evacuation behavior for every resident at risk of hurricane harm, the arrival of partisan differences in evacuation rates is alarming.
Our study cannot delineate why political affiliation has come to affect evacuation decision-making.
Have beliefs about the likelihood of hurricane harm diverged, or is media-fueled partisanship shifting behavior, independent of beliefs?
Reaching the majority of residents who stay behind despite extensive warnings-and targeting those most vulnerable to storm harm-will require improvement in the public's trust of vital hurricane information. In the current era of "fake news" dominating headlines and the widening politicization of shared risks, finding credible, nonpartisan ways of communicating the potential dangers of hurricanes are warranted. 
Tropical Storm Tropical Storm Hurricane Hurricane Florida County
Watch Warning Watch Warning BAY 9/9/17 11:00 9/9/17 17:00 BREVARD 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 11:00 9/9/17 05:00 BROWARD 9/10/17 23:00 9/7/17 11:00 9/7/17 23:00 CHARLOTTE 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 23:00 9/8/17 17:00 CITRUS 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 17:00 9/9/17 05:00 COLLIER 9/10/17 23:00 9/7/17 11:00 9/7/17 23:00 DIXIE 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 11:00 DUVAL 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 11:00 FLAGLER 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 11:00 FRANKLIN 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 17:00 GLADES 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 11:00 9/7/17 23:00 GULF 9/9/17 11:00 9/9/17 17:00 HENDRY 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 11:00 9/7/17 23:00 HERNANDO 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 17:00 9/9/17 05:00 HILLSBOROUGH 9/11/17 05:00 9/8/17 11:00 9/8/17 23:00 INDIAN RIVER 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 23:00 9/8/17 17:00 JEFFERSON 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 17:00 LEE 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 23:00 9/8/17 17:00 LEVY 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 17:00 9/9/17 11:00 MANATEE 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 23:00 9/8/17 17:00 MARTIN 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 23:00 9/8/17 17:00 MIAMI-DADE 9/10/17 23:00 9/7/17 11:00 9/7/17 23:00 MONROE 9/10/17 23:00 9/7/17 11:00 9/7/17 23:00 NASSAU 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 11:00 OKEECHOBEE 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 11:00 9/7/17 23:00 PALM BEACH 9/10/17 23:00 9/7/17 11:00 9/7/17 23:00 PASCO 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 17:00 9/9/17 05:00 PINELLAS 9/11/17 05:00 9/8/17 11:00 9/8/17 23:00 SARASOTA 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 23:00 9/8/17 17:00 ST. JOHNS 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 11:00 ST. LUCIE 9/11/17 05:00 9/7/17 23:00 9/8/17 17:00 TAYLOR 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 11:00 VOLUSIA 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 11:00 9/9/17 05:00 WAKULLA 9/11/17 08:00 9/8/17 23:00 9/9/17 17:00 WALTON 9/9/17 11:00 9/9/17 17:00
